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Environmental Law

Court of Appeals Expands SEQRA
Standing After an 18-Year Detour

T

he most controversial decision in New York
environmental jurisprudence is almost
certainly Society of the Plastics Industry
v. County of Suffolk (Plastics),1 in which
the Court of Appeals ruled in 1991 that
plaintiffs in suits under the State Environmental
Quality Review Act (SEQRA) must show that they
are affected differently than the public at large.
In the 18 years since that decision, the New
York Attorney General, the State Department
of Environmental Conservation, the New York
State and New York City bar associations, and
numerous environmental groups all filed amicus
briefs or issued reports calling for the reversal
of the decision. Albany Law School held an allday conference in 2002 on the subject. The State
Legislature came close to amending SEQRA to
effect a reversal. Yet the Court of Appeals rejected
all entreaties to revisit the decision.
At last, a 3-2 decision by the Appellate
Division, Third Department, in 2008 meant
an as-of-right appeal, so the issue could no
longer be avoided.2 On Oct. 27, 2009, the Court
of Appeals ruled in Save the Pine Bush Inc. v.
Common Council of the City of Albany.3 While
not explicitly overruling Plastics, five of the
seven members of the high court made clear
that the lower courts had taken an 18-year
detour from what their predecessors had
intended back in 1991. In so doing, the Court
explicitly addressed one of the two major
scenarios in which the old ruling was seen to
have created an obstacle, and it showed the
path to pleading around the obstacle in the
other scenario.

Predecessors and Progeny
Prior to 1991, standing was not much of an
issue in SEQRA litigation, except when the
plaintiff was pursuing purely economic and
not environmental interests. But then came
Plastics. Suffolk County had banned the use
of certain plastic products by restaurants.
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The ban was challenged on SEQRA grounds
by the plastics industry trade association
and one of its members, Lawrence Wittman
& Co., which happened to be located in
Suffolk County.
The Court of Appeals found the association
had no standing because it itself would not
be affected by the ban. Wittman was local
but had made only a “tenuous assertion of
harm it would suffer.” The plaintiffs alleged
the plastics law would cause environmental

Standing under SEQRA is still far from
automatic, but it is now easier than it
has been for 18 years.
harm at landfills by increasing truck traffic
there, and by leading to harmful disposal of
more paper waste. By a 4-3 vote, the Court
found that, “having failed to allege any threat
of cognizable injury it would suffer, different
in kind or degree from the public at large,”
Wittman lacked standing under SEQRA.
It may have made sense to prevent a
plastics manufacturer from getting into
court by posing as an environmentalist.
However, the decision’s reference to injury
“different in kind or degree from the public
at large” led some lower courts astray.
Injury that is different from the public’s
is a familiar concept in the law of public
nuisance, where it allows only those with
special harm to assert claims that are
ordinarily brought by the government.4 But
special harm—as opposed to harm—had not

previously been needed under SEQRA, and
has not been required in order to establish
standing in cases under SEQRA’s federal
counterpart, the National Environmental
Policy Act, or under the similar laws of 15
other states.5
Within six months after Plastics, appellate
courts began citing it in denying standing
to environmental groups. Some of these
cases involved plaintiffs who did not allege
they would be adversely affected by the
challenged action, and thus would have
been denied standing even before Plastics.6
However, 1994 saw the first appellate decision
denying standing to a plaintiff who alleged
actual injury, but the same as the public at
large—in that case, pollution of a lake from
which many people draw water.7
Such denials became a trend. In late 2002,
I conducted a statistical survey of SEQRA
standing cases. I found that prior to Plastics,
in those cases where standing was raised,
68 percent were allowed to go forward; but
between Plastics and the time of the survey,
only 48 percent were allowed to proceed. The
courts fell into a pattern of looking mostly
at a plaintiff’s proximity to the challenged
project as a way of testing whether the injury
was different from the public at large. With
only one outlier, at the time of the survey, in
the appellate cases every plaintiff who was
more than 500 feet from the subject project
was denied standing, and every plaintiff
whose distance was 500 feet or less was
granted standing.8
This tendency has continued. So far in
2009 there have been at least three appellate
decisions denying standing in SEQRA cases
because the plaintiff did not allege injury
different than the public at large.9
Such was the unhappiness with the
restrictive standing doctrine that had
emerged that every year since 2004 the New
York Assembly had passed a bill, sponsored
by Assemblyman Adam Bradley, that would
eliminate special harm as a requirement for
standing under SEQRA. After the Democrats
took over control of the Senate in January
2009, the bill appeared to be on its way to
passage there too, but (like much of the
rest of the state’s business) progress was
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derailed when the Senate suffered a political
meltdown in June 2009.10

‘Save the Pine Bush’
The world of SEQRA standing changed
suddenly in October 2009 in the latest of
many disputes over the development of the
Albany Pine Bush, an ecologically precious
area. Save the Pine Bush Inc. challenged a
rezoning that would allow construction of a
hotel. The environmental impact statement
(EIS) that had been prepared under SEQRA
addressed the project’s impact on the
endangered Karner Blue butterfly, but not
other rare species that were alleged to reside
in the area. Save the Pine Bush and nine of
its members sued on the grounds the EIS
should have evaluated possible threats to
the other species.
The defendant City of Albany said the
plaintiffs lacked standing. In a 3-2 decision,
the Appellate Division found they had
standing. Because of the split, the city had
an as-of-right appeal under CPLR 5601(a).
Thus the case went up.
In a decision written by Judge Robert S.
Smith, a 5-2 majority of the Court of Appeals
found plaintiffs have standing. Though the
closest lives about half a mile away, the
Court stated that Plastics “does not hold, or
suggest, that residence close to a challenged
project is an indispensable element of
standing in every environmental case.” The
Court declared its adherence to the rule
of Plastics that “[i]n land use matters…the
plaintiff, for standing purposes, must show
that it would suffer direct harm, injury that
is in some way different from that of the
public at large.” However, plaintiffs alleged
that they “use the Pine Bush for recreation
and to study and enjoy the unique habitat
found there.” The Court found, “It is clear in
context that they allege repeated, not rare
or isolated use. This meets the Society of
Plastics test by showing that the threatened
harm of which petitioners complain will
affect them differently from ‘the public
at large.’”
The Court was careful to note that “we do
not suggest that standing in environmental
cases is automatic, or can be met by
perfunctory allegations of harm. Plaintiffs
must not only allege, but if the issue is
disputed must prove, that their injury is real
and different from the injury most members
of the public face.”
Concluding its discussion of standing,
the Court stated, “Thus, while we decline
to erect standing barriers that will often
be insuperable, we are also conscious of
the danger of making these barriers too
low,” in view of the long delays that can
attend SEQRA litigation. “Striking the right
balance in these cases will often be difficult,
but we believe that our rule—requiring a
demonstration that a plaintiff’s use of a
resource is more than that of the general

public—will accomplish that task better
than the alternatives.”
Turning to the merits, the Court found that
plaintiffs had failed to establish that further
investigations should have been conducted
of various species. Thus, the Court ordered
that the petition be dismissed.
Judge Eugene F. Pigott Jr. wrote a
concurring opinion, joined by Judge
Susan Phillips Read. They agreed with the
dismissal of the suit on the merits, but
they stated that the majority’s holding
“reinterprets much too broadly the special
harm requirement that has been the
cornerstone of our standing jurisprudence
in land use cases.” They would reaffirm the
use of the 500-foot guideline, and disputed
that frequent visits to a site are enough to
establish standing. The majority’s holding,
they said, “results in Save the Pine Bush
and its members having standing to sue
whenever a project site, no matter where
its location, may have a potential impact
on animals and plants that happen to live
on the Pine Bush.”

Consequences
The decision is a clear victor y for
environmental plaintiffs who seek to protect
places that they care about, and repeatedly
visit, but do not reside near. The logic that
the Court applied to an endangered species
habitat would presumably apply as well to
a remote corner of the Adirondacks and a
historic building in the middle of a city.
That is one of the two major scenarios in
which Plastics has arisen—a precious place
far from home. The other involves threats
at home to resources that many people use
equally—most prominently, the air and the
water. The Court reaffirmed that SEQRA
plaintiffs must “suffer direct harm, injury
that is in some way different from that of the
public at large.” Thousands or millions of
people may breathe the same air and drink
the same water. Therefore can no one sue?
However, some people may be especially
susceptible to the pollution in a way that
differs from the public at large, such as
those with respiratory diseases like asthma,
and those with impaired immune systems.
Thus, going forward, counsel undertaking
pollution cases under SEQRA may seek
out prospective plaintiffs with special
physical vulnerabilities.
A potential difficulty arises from the
Court’s new rule “requiring a demonstration
that a plaintiff’s use of a resource is more
than that of the general public.” This rule is
directly aimed at the first scenario, not the
second. It remains to be seen how narrowly
or broadly this rule will be interpreted in
future decisions.
Pollution plaintiffs may be encouraged
by the Court’s statement that “we adopt
a rule similar to one long established in
the federal courts.” The Court cited Sierra

Club v. Morton, 11 a classic 1972 decision
in which the U.S. Supreme Court declared
that “[a]esthetic and environmental
well-being, like economic well-being, are
important ingredients of the quality of life
in our society, and the fact that particular
environmental interests are shared by the
many rather than the few does not make
them less deserving of legal protection
through the judicial process.” The Court
also cited Friends of the Earth Inc. v. Laidlaw
Environmental Services (TOC) Inc., 12 a
water pollution suit, in which the Supreme
Court granted standing to plaintiffs who
had used the affected river for fishing and
wading, but were inhibited by the fear of the
defendant’s effluent.
Finally, the Court of Appeals gave special
standing deference to Save the Pine Bush Inc.,
a long-established, indisputably legitimate
group with a particular interest in the area
at issue in the case. But it declared that
“in other cases, including those brought
by organizations devoted to less specific
environmental interests—the plaintiff in
Sierra Club, for example—plaintiffs may be
put to their proof on the issue of injury,
and if they cannot prove injury their cases
will fail.” Thus, standing under SEQRA is
still far from automatic, but it is now easier
than it has been for 18 years. The decision
is unlikely to lead to more lawsuits being
filed (the law of standing in New York after
Plastics had been so confusing that probably
few plaintiffs were deterred from suing, since
they still had a shot at prevailing), but it will
allow more suits to stay in court, especially
if they are carefully pled.
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